$10M Seed · AUM as the Engine · Eight Legs · Portfolio-Balanced
This is the kick-off memo for a $10,000,000 seed — nearly three times the $3.5M we mapped in the last version, and the money is placed with more discipline, not just more of it. The hierarchy is the same one that worked before, inverted on purpose: instead of handing each business a lump sum and hoping, we place the bulk of the capital inside the AUM platform — the central engine — and let it throw off monthly cash that feeds the operating businesses a little at a time, as each one actually needs it. Of the $10M, $5.27M sits inside AUM as two feeder boxes: a $2.85M Carry-Feeder that earns about $199.5K/mo at 7% and is spent entirely on servicing the cost of the raise itself (it nets zero to us by design — it just makes the raise pay for itself), and a $2.42M Ops-Feeder that earns about $193.6K/mo at 8% and is distributed round-robin to the operating legs, phased over months rather than dumped in on day one. The remaining $4.73M seeds the operating businesses directly: the Car Business Repair Cure + Social Entertainment Business ($600K → $65K/mo), the Consortium Law core ($1.73M → $1.155M/mo at steady state), the SBA Boomerang ($690K → $50K/mo, principal recovered), ThinkBuildGrow.ai ($260K, the tech stack every other leg runs on), NewCo Green HVAC ($700K → $350K/mo), and the new eighth leg, Proceeds — Legal Case Lending ($750K), a low-risk cash-flow ballast that pays when the operating businesses hit a rough patch. The Apartment Acquisition leg keeps running in parallel, self-funded, exactly as before — it does not draw on this $10M. Principal stays parked and working; the businesses grow on the trickle until they throw off their own revenue. At steady state the whole machine returns roughly $1.82M/month to the holding company. This deck shows exactly where every dollar goes and, just as important, why it goes there.
The Brief
01 — The Eight-Leg Architecture
Here is the whole machine on one page. The $10,000,000 raise is placed inside AUM as the central engine, split into two feeder boxes. The $2.85M Carry-Feeder earns about $199.5K/mo at 7% — all of it routed straight back to cover the cost of carrying the $10M raise, so it is a wash to us on purpose (it makes the raise self-financing). The $2.42M Ops-Feeder earns about $193.6K/mo at 8%, and that cash is distributed round-robin to the operating legs — a little to each, phased month by month as each business is ready to absorb it, never lump-sum. The principal never leaves AUM; only the monthly profit moves. The remaining $4.73M seeds the operating legs directly to their target sizes: Car Business Repair Cure + Social Entertainment ($600K), Consortium Law core ($1.73M), SBA Boomerang ($690K), ThinkBuildGrow.ai ($260K), NewCo Green HVAC ($700K), and the new Proceeds — Legal Case Lending leg ($750K). Each operating leg keeps its own target line but is topped up from the Ops-Feeder trickle while it ramps, so no business is starved and no dollar sits idle. Leg 6 — Apartment Acquisition — runs self-funded in parallel and does not touch this $10M. The bottom row of the chart shows what each leg throws off once it reaches steady state; together they roll up to about $1.82M/month.
Assumption: AUM yield targets (7% Carry, 8% Ops) carried forward unchanged from v6.6 and applied to the larger base — if the platform’s realized yield differs, these two lines move first. Full source-of-truth for every dollar in this chart: phases/P2_norma_allocation_numbers.json.
02 — The Engine · $2.85M Carry-Feeder (7%) + $2.42M Ops-Feeder (8%)
This is the heart of the whole structure, so it comes first. Of the $10M, $5.27M — about 61 cents of every free dollar — is placed inside the AUM platform and left there. We do not spend this money; we let it earn, and we spend the earnings. It is bookkept as two boxes with two different jobs. The $2.85M Carry-Feeder earns roughly $199.5K/mo at a 7% monthly yield, and every dollar of that is sent right back out to service the cost of carrying the $10M raise — so it contributes zero to our own bottom line by design. That sounds strange until you see the point: it makes the raise pay for itself, so the offering carries no drag. Assumption: we sized the Carry-Feeder to cover a coupon that scales up from the prior raise ($70K/mo on $3.5M → about $200K/mo on $10M); at a 7% yield, covering $200K/mo requires $2.857M parked, which we rounded to $2.85M. The $2.42M Ops-Feeder earns about $193.6K/mo at 8%, and this is the pump — the monthly cash that trickle-funds Law’s operating cycle and tops up SBA, HVAC, Car+Social, and Proceeds while they ramp. The engine is live in month one; both feeders throw off their first cash immediately, before any operating leg has warmed up. Nothing else in this deck works without this box.
Why this matters. The AUM engine is the whole architecture’s cash pump — principal stays parked and only the monthly profits are distributed. Feeder 1 self-services the carry cost of the raise (net-zero drag on the offering itself). Feeder 2 phases the operating legs into existence over months, matching capital delivery to each business’ readiness rather than dumping the full stack on day one. Combined AUM allocation = $5.27M = 60.9% of the free-to-allocate $8.65M — well above the 42% floor Sloane sets for the engine (P1b §5). The two director assets — 818 N 46th Hollywood FL, 24–36 Dempsey Edgewater NJ — continue to ride on the Carry-Feeder alongside the $10M debt service.
03 — Leg 1 · $600K Seed → $65K/mo · First Cash ~Month 2
Leg 1 is an operating basket Joe is already underwriting, and its job in the portfolio is early, reliable cash while the bigger legs are still ramping. We seed it with $600K — a figure Joe anchored, so we did not re-optimize it — and it targets $65,000/month in revenue back to the holding company, which works out to about 10.8% per month on the cash invested. In plain terms: it is one of the first legs to pay, with first cash landing around month 2, because these are operating businesses that bill monthly rather than waiting on a settlement or a construction cycle. That speed is the whole reason it sits near the front of the funding line. The capital is topped up from the Ops-Feeder trickle as the businesses absorb it, the same way every operating leg is fed, so the $600K arrives in phases rather than all at once. Compared with the last version of this deck, the monthly cell is up modestly — $65K vs the old $60K — reflecting the anchored target Joe set for the renamed leg. What the operating partner should expect month by month: small revenue by month 2, building toward the $65K/mo run-rate as the basket fully deploys over the first quarter, then holding there as steady, unglamorous, dependable cash — exactly the role a fast-paying leg is supposed to play in a portfolio full of slower, bigger bets.
Read this honestly. The $600K seed and $65K/mo target are Joe-anchored figures we did not re-optimize; the portfolio math is built to respect them. Net (after program-level loss, fees, and timing) lands lower than the headline — the deck shows the target because that is the underwriting hurdle Joe is running against. The basket sits on the holding-co balance sheet alongside the FL portfolio; revenue cell scales with cumulative deployment through the first quarter and holds thereafter.
04 — Leg 2 · $1.73M Seed → $1.155M/mo Steady State · 18–36 Month Ramp
Consortium Law is the largest single revenue line in the whole portfolio — about $1.155M/month at steady state — and it also takes the longest to get there, on an 18-to-36-month ramp with first meaningful cash around month 6. We seed it with $1.73M, up sharply from the $400K in the prior version. Here is the honest part, and it matters: the extra money does not buy a bigger monthly number. Law’s output is limited by how fast cases move through the pipeline — case-processing velocity — not by how much cash we pour in. So the $1.155M/mo steady state is held unchanged; what the extra $1.33M actually buys is runway and safety: a real stand-up budget for Day Law and the Marketing/PI joint venture, a bigger seed for the case-acquisition cycle, and a settlement-timing buffer that protects three-plus years of monthly operating cost against the natural lumpiness of when settlements land. Assumption: the $1.155M/mo figure is inherited from the prior version and not re-diligenced this cycle; the real test lives in the JV and Day Law case-processing capacity, which is Robert and Katrina’s territory. Under-funding this leg’s runway is the one mistake that would make the whole plan read as fragile — a slow leg with a thin buffer is a leg that stalls. Month by month: costs first, cash later, then a large and growing line once the marketing funnel and Day Law reach design capacity around Q3 2028.
Read this honestly. The extra $1.33M vs v6.6’s $400K buys stand-up runway + MVA seed depth + settlement-timing buffer, NOT lift on the monthly ceiling. If Law under-delivers by 20% at steady state (to $924K/mo), the whole portfolio rollup slips to ~$1.594M/mo — essentially flat against v6.6’s $1.617M baseline — because AUM Ops, HVAC, SBA, Car+Social, and Proceeds all fire independently. Sensitivity detail on Slide 13.
05 — Leg 3 · $690K Seed → $50K/mo · Principal Recovered
The SBA Boomerang is the most capital-efficient operating leg we have, because of one feature no other leg shares: the principal comes back. We put money down to acquire a small business using SBA-backed financing, and the financing structure returns most of our down payment to us — so the same dollars can be redeployed while we keep the acquired business. We seed it at $690K, up from $250K, which is enough to fund two acquisitions inside 24 months: Assumption: the first closes around month 6 and ramps by month 12, the second closes around month 15 and ramps by month 24. Target steady-state revenue is $50,000/month — double the prior version’s $25K. Assumption: a straight-line read on the larger seed would suggest ~$69K/mo, but we deliberately discounted to $50K because real SBA deal-flow does not double smoothly; the second acquisition is realistically smaller and slower than the first. The bottleneck here is finding and underwriting good deals, not money, which is exactly why we stopped at this size rather than pushing higher. One caution the operating partner should hear plainly: a personal guarantee is the standard structure on SBA 7(a) acquisition debt — this is the one leg in the portfolio that likely carries a personal guarantee, so Robert reads every term sheet before either business closes. Month by month: quiet through month 6, first business ramping by month 12, second business joining by month 24, principal recovered along the way to fund the next move.
Read this honestly. The bottleneck on this leg is deal-flow, not capital — that is why we stopped at $690K rather than pushing to a linear-yield ceiling. And the PG on SBA 7(a) acquisition debt is the single tail-risk item in the portfolio (Theo P1a §5): Robert reviews the term sheet before either close, and disclosure language in the offering must reflect it. Sensitivity is bounded — even at $50K/mo the leg is 2.7% of the steady-state rollup.
06 — Leg 4 · $260K Seed · Reinvested · The Tech Stack Behind the Portfolio
ThinkBuildGrow.ai is the odd one out on this deck, and that is by design: it is not a yield play, it is the tooling the rest of the portfolio depends on. It is the software stack that runs the operating legs — the integrations, the automation, the systems that make the round-robin trickle mechanic and the day-to-day operations of every other business actually work. We seed it with $260K, up from $100K in the prior version. It shows no monthly revenue line on the roll-up because its returns are reinvested, not distributed — putting a revenue number next to it would misrepresent what it is. So why fund it more if it does not pay a monthly dividend? Because a starved platform does not fail loudly on its own line — it fails quietly, by making everyone else’s ramp slower. At $10M scale there are more operating legs to support, more operators to equip, and more automation worth building, so the stack needs meaningfully more headroom than $100K bought. Think of it as cheap insurance against the whole portfolio running slower than it should. Assumption: TBG’s own profit rate is still to be set by Joe, so we model it as distributing $0 for now; if it does begin to distribute, this becomes a small positive line and the roll-up lifts slightly. Month by month: no dividend to watch — instead, watch whether the other legs are hitting their ramps, because that is where this money shows up.
Read this honestly. TBG is the odd one out on the deck by design — the platform every other leg quietly runs on. There is no monthly line to watch here; watch whether Legs 1, 2, 3, 5, and 8 are hitting their ramps, because that is where this $260K is really scored. Assumption: TBG’s own profit rate remains TBD per Joe (Sloane Gap #5); if it starts distributing at any point, this slide’s revenue cell flips from silver-zero to a gold number and the delta shows up in the Slide 13 rollup, not here.
07 — Leg 5 · $700K Seed → $350K/mo · Highest Near-Term Operating Yield
HVAC is the highest near-term operating yield in the portfolio per dollar invested, and we treat it accordingly — but carefully. We seed it with $700K, up from $100K, and target $350,000/month at steady state, with first cash around month 4 and a ramp of roughly 8 months. Assumption: that $350K/mo comes from roughly doubling install capacity — from about 40 installs a week toward about 93 a week over the first year — and it is explicitly not a straight-line 7× scale-up of the old $152K/mo, because install volume is limited by how many crews the licensed contractor can field, not by cash. NewCo Green sources the customers and runs the marketing and admin; a licensed HVAC contractor carries the trade license and technical authority; a finance partner funds approved customers. Here is the deliberate discipline: we sized HVAC $340K below the ceiling we could have justified, and we did it because two of the three partners are not yet under contract. Until the licensed contractor and the finance partner are papered, over-funding this leg would strand capital in a business that cannot yet spend it. If both close by the time Simon renders this deck, we queue a top-up; if either drags, we have not tied up money that had faster homes. Month by month: ramping installs from month 4, approaching the $350K/mo run-rate by month 12 — the single biggest non-Law contributor once it is firing.
The counterparty gate. HVAC’s $700K is contingent on both external counterparties papering by month 3 (FCM = 4). If either drags, we drop HVAC to floor (~$519K) and rehouse the freed $181K into the Ops-Feeder. Sensitivity: if HVAC ramps in 24 months instead of 12 (to $250K/mo), 12-month cumulative drops ~$1.36M but steady-state still lands above v6.6 baseline — a cash-flow-timing risk, not a run-rate risk. That is why the leg is sized below its ceiling.
Assumption · ramp shape. The $1,925K 12-mo cumulative comes from Norma P2’s discrete-linear ramp convention: for month j in [FCM, FCM + ramp − 1], the leg pays (j − FCM + 1) / ramp × steady-state, then flat at steady-state from month FCM + ramp onward. HVAC (FCM = 4, ramp = 8 months, SS = $350K): months 4–11 pay $43.75K, $87.5K, …, $350K in eighths; month 12 pays the plateau $350K — sum $1,925K exactly. Underlying install rate ramps ~40→93/wk contractor-capacity-bound; not a continuous triangle-area calc.
08 — Leg 8 · $750K Seed → $11K/mo net · Lowest-Variance Leg · NEW
This is the new eighth leg, and its purpose is different from every other leg on the deck: it is ballast, not an engine, and the slide should say so out loud. Proceeds is a business we already see happening around our own cases — we just own it. When a personal-injury plaintiff is waiting on a settlement and needs cash now, we advance her money today against her eventual recovery. The critical thing: it is not a loan — it is a non-recourse purchase of a slice of her future settlement. If the case loses, she owes us nothing and we absorb it; there is no monthly payment, no credit check, no personal guarantee. We are underwriting the case, not the person. We seed it at $750K — a figure Joe anchored — and it spreads across roughly 75 advances of about $10,000 each, so no single case can hurt us. On our pricing, seven cases in eight pay us back at 1.55× our advance, and the eighth pays nothing; we price so the seven cover the eighth. Be honest about the monthly number: net contribution is about $11,000/month at steady state — the lowest monthly-yield-per-dollar leg here — and it is a J-curve: a small drag (about −$25K cumulative) through month 9, first cash-positive around month 10. But at ~18.5%/year on a non-recourse book, it is a genuinely good absolute return and, crucially, its cash does not rise and fall with the construction or real-estate cycle — so it keeps paying when HVAC or SBA hit a slow patch. That independence is what $750K buys.
| Mo | Face book ($K) | Fee profit ($K) | Servicing ($K) | Net to P&L ($K) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 40 | 0.0 | 2.4 | −2.4 |
| 3 | 147 | 0.7 | 3.6 | −2.9 |
| 6 | 399 | 2.5 | 6.0 | −3.5 |
| 9 | 686 | 5.7 | 6.6 | −0.9 |
| 10 | 750 | 7.0 | 5.2 | +1.8 |
| 12 | 750 | 9.2 | 1.8 | +7.4 |
| 15 | 750 | 12.0 | 2.3 | +9.7 |
| 18 | 750 | 13.6 | 2.6 | +11.0 |
| 24 | 750 | 13.7 | 2.6 | +11.0 |
Four facts. (1) Full deployment: month 10. (2) First cash-in: month 2; first cash-positive: month 10. (3) The J-curve is small: −$25.2K cumulative through month 9. (4) Steady state $11K/mo, asymptote $11.9K at month 36+. Principal recycles at ~$44K/month; could be swept instead of redeployed — that is a live design option (Theo Gap #7).
Ballast, not engine. Per dollar of seed, Proceeds is the lowest-yielding leg (1.47%/mo) — below Car+Social (10.8%/mo), below SBA (7.2%/mo), well below HVAC (50%/mo) and Law (66.8%/mo). On an absolute basis, 18.5%/yr unlevered on a non-recourse book is genuinely good; on a portfolio-fit basis, its job is different.
Non-recourse, actuarially bounded. ~75 files at ~$10K each = concentration risk LOW at the file level; the engine caps a single case at $100K. Loss rate 12% is sourced (Avraham & Sebok, Cornell Law Review, 100K+ funding requests); the whole business is contained in "we price so the seven cover the eighth."
Low correlation to the rest of the book. Cash arrival is driven by carrier settlement behavior, not construction cycles or install ramps or SBA deal-flow. When HVAC or SBA hits a slow quarter, Proceeds keeps paying. A $10M portfolio of all operating businesses has no ballast — one bad cycle hits every leg at once. $750K buys an un-correlated, low-variance cash line: insurance you get paid to hold.
Compliance built in code. New York Consumer Litigation Funding Act encoded — 25%-of-gross cap, our 15% target lands compliant by construction (16.12% max at 1.55×). Georgia requires NMLS. Ten states pending review route every offer to a licensed reviewer. Every other state refuses by default — silence never reads as permission.
Sensitivity: if the default rate is 2× Theo’s assumption (24% instead of 12%), Proceeds monthly falls to ~$3K — but that is only 0.4% of the rollup. The ballast leg stays positive even in its own worst case, and the fund does not depend on it. That is precisely the design.
09 — Leg 6 · Self-Funded · 200 Units/yr · Not Drawn From the $10M
Apartment Acquisition is a full leg of the architecture, but it sits outside the $10M budget on purpose — it is self-funded by the operator and runs in parallel, exactly as it did in the prior version. It does not touch the AUM engine, the feeders, or any of the operating-leg trickle. Target throughput is 200 units per year minimum, focused on distressed buildings, currently sourced in the Louisiana market with more markets to follow as the cadence proves out. For a typical 80-unit building, the economics Joe supplies are $500K of revenue at acquisition, $15K/month for 12 months during the construction and value-add phase ($180K cumulative), and $25K/month in net operating income in perpetuity once the building stabilizes. Why keep it out of the $10M when it is a genuinely good business? Because it is the slowest, lumpiest, and most capital-hungry-per-unit-of-near-term-cash leg on the table, and it already funds itself — pulling it into the $10M would consume scarce fast-cash flexibility that has higher-and-faster-yielding homes right now (that is the portfolio logic on the next slide). Assumption: the $500K / $15K / $25K figures are Joe-supplied operating metrics for the typical 80-unit distressed profile and are not third-party diligenced at this iteration. Month by month: two to three building acquisitions a year on its own cadence, gated by deal-flow and crew capacity rather than by anything in the $10M plan. It stays on the deck because it is real revenue — it just does not compete for these dollars.
Why it’s here and not in the rollup line. Apartment is real revenue but it is not competing for these dollars. Sloane P1b §5 flags it as the best diversifier we have and the slowest and most capital-hungry per unit of near-term cash. An optional 0–12% inside-sleeve remains a live tool for deal-by-deal opportunistic co-invest but is unused in this base case. If pulled inside, we would need real acq-plus-rehab numbers — not the $500K revenue-at-acquisition figure (Sloane Gap #3).
10 — The Logic Behind the Numbers · Diversification Over Concentration
If you remember one slide from this deck, make it this one, because it explains why the money is divided the way it is rather than just how much goes where. We did not split the $10M into equal slices, and we did not pile it into the single highest-returning leg. We sized each leg by highest-and-best-use — asking, for every marginal dollar, four questions: How fast does it come back? How much does it earn per dollar? How risky is it? And does it behave differently from the other legs? The answers pull in different directions, and balancing them is the strategy.
Consider the temptation to concentrate. Consortium Law earns the most per dollar and HVAC earns the most per dollar in the near term — so why not put everything there? Two reasons. First, Law is capped by case-velocity, not cash: past a point, more money buys runway, not revenue, so a dollar beyond that point earns nothing extra. Second, HVAC is the highest-variance leg — its return depends on an install ramp and two partners who are not yet under contract, so a dollar over-committed there is a dollar exposed to an execution risk we do not yet control. Concentration would mean betting the fund on the two legs whose extra dollars either can’t be used or carry the most risk. That is why concentration is not the safe choice — it only looks safe because the headline return is high.
| Leg | Time to first cash (months, lower = faster) |
Cash yield per dollar (%/mo of seed) |
Margin quality (low = highest-variance) |
Diversification value (low = most independent) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| L7 · AUM Central Engine | 1 (rank 1) | 3.7% combined | rank 2 (Carry net-zero; Ops bank-yield-like) | rank 6 (whole book depends on it) |
| L1 · Car+Social | 2 (rank 2) | 10.8% | rank 4 (basket; Joe-underwriting) | rank 4 |
| L5 · NewCo Green HVAC | 4 (rank 3) | 50.0% | rank 7 (highest-variance · 2 partners open) | rank 5 (construction-cycle) |
| L2 · Consortium Law Core | 6 | 66.8% | rank 3 (case-velocity, not cash) | rank 5 |
| L3 · SBA Boomerang | 6 | 7.2% | rank 8 (only tail-risk leg · PG) | rank 3 |
| L8 · Proceeds (NEW) | 10 (cash-positive) | 1.47% | rank 1 (lowest-variance) | rank 1 (settlement-driven · independent) |
| L4 · ThinkBuildGrow.ai | — | 0% (reinvested) | rank 5 (platform, no cash line) | rank 8 (supports every leg) |
| L6 · Apartment (OUT) | lump · per bldg | self-funded | rank 6 | rank 2 (RE cycle-independent) |
So we balanced across four dimensions. Speed: Car+Social and the AUM Ops-Feeder pay from months one and two, bridging the long ramps on Law and HVAC. Yield: HVAC and Law get real weight because they earn, but each is held at the point where the next dollar stops working — HVAC $340K below its ceiling until its partners paper, Law at the size that funds runway without pretending cash lifts a velocity-bound line. Recoverability: the SBA Boomerang gets a full seed precisely because its principal comes back, so those dollars work twice. Independence: Proceeds earns the least per dollar of any leg — and we funded it anyway, with $750K, because it is the only leg whose cash does not move with the real-estate and construction cycle. When HVAC or SBA hits a slow quarter, Proceeds keeps paying. A $10M portfolio built entirely of operating businesses has no ballast; one bad cycle hits every leg at once. The $750K in Proceeds is the deliberate purchase of an un-correlated, low-variance cash line — insurance you get paid to hold.
The same logic is why Apartment Acquisition stays out of the $10M. It is the best diversifier on paper, but it is also the slowest and most capital-per-unit-of-near-term-cash leg we have, and it already funds itself — so bringing it in would spend scarce fast-cash flexibility on a leg that does not need it. And it is why AUM gets the largest single allocation, $5.27M: the engine that funds every other leg’s ramp is worth more than any one operating business, and we held it above a hard floor — combined AUM never drops below 42% of the free capital — because starving the pump starves everything downstream. Assumption: the correlations behind this reasoning are argued from the economics of each leg, not from a measured return-covariance matrix — this is directional portfolio judgment, not a statistical optimization. But the direction is right: eight legs, sized so that no single failure — a slow Law ramp, an HVAC partner who walks, a bad Proceeds cohort — can take the portfolio down. That is what balance buys, and it is the whole idea behind v7.
11 — The Roll-up · Eight Legs · Every Revenue Cell at Steady State
Here is every dollar and every revenue cell in one place. The $10M is placed inside AUM as the engine ($2.85M Carry-Feeder + $2.42M Ops-Feeder); the Carry-Feeder’s ~$199.5K/mo carries the raise at net-zero, and the Ops-Feeder’s ~$193.6K/mo trickle-funds the operating legs. At steady state the legs contribute: Car+Social $65K/mo, Consortium Law $1,155K/mo, SBA Boomerang $50K/mo, ThinkBuildGrow.ai $0 (reinvested), NewCo Green HVAC $350K/mo, Proceeds $11K/mo, plus the AUM Ops-Feeder line at $193.6K/mo. Added up, the whole machine returns about $1,824,600/month to the holding company at steady state. Against the prior version’s baseline of about $1,617,000/month, that is +$207,600/mo, or +12.8%. Here is the honest reason it is +12.8% and not 3× on a raise that is 2.86× larger, because an operating partner should hear it straight: (a) most of the extra capital funds carry on the bigger raise ($1.85M of the increase went into the Carry-Feeder, which nets zero by design), (b) Law’s monthly line is capped by case-velocity, so its extra seed bought runway rather than a higher number, and (c) Apartment is deliberately kept out of this budget, so its old $25K/mo line is no longer counted here (it still runs, just self-funded). Where the extra dollars do lift the monthly: HVAC (+$198K), SBA (+$25K), Car+Social (+$5K), and the new Proceeds line (+$11K).
| # | Leg | Capital seed | Revenue rate | Monthly @ steady state |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| L7 | AUM Central Engine · $2.85M Carry-Feeder + $2.42M Ops-Feeder | $5,270,000 | 7% Carry (net-zero) + 8% Ops (net to P&L) | $193,600 Carry $199.5K @ 7% → carries the raise (net-zero) · Ops $193.6K @ 8% → to P&L |
| L1 | Car Business Repair Cure + Social Entertainment Business (Joe-anchored) | $600,000 | ~10.8%/mo target | $65,000 +$5K vs v6.6 · first cash ~mo 2 |
| L2 | Consortium Law Core (MVA seed + Day Law + Marketing/PI JV + buffer) | $1,730,000 | V2 + V3 steady state (case-velocity-bound) | $1,155,000 held from v6.6 anchor · 18–36 mo ramp |
| L3 | SBA Boomerang (2 acquisitions in 24 mo · principal recovered) | $690,000 | 2 acquisitions at steady state | $50,000 2× v6.6 · PG on 7(a) is disclosure item |
| L4 | ThinkBuildGrow.ai (platform / cost-center) | $260,000 | reinvested (rate TBD per Joe) | $0 no revenue line by design |
| L5 | NewCo Green HVAC (ramp from ~40 to ~93 installs/wk) | $700,000 | contractor-capacity-bound at steady state | $350,000 2.3× v6.6 · $340K short of ceiling until partners paper |
| L8 | Proceeds — Legal Case Lending (NEW · the portfolio’s ballast) | $750,000 | 1.55× contract multiple · 18.5%/yr unlevered | $11,000 band $9K–$14K · asymptote $11.9K at mo 36+ |
| L6 | Leg 6 · Apartment Acquisition (self-funded parallel · NOT in $10M budget) | Self-funded | per typical 80-unit bldg: $500K acq + $15K/mo × 12 + $25K/mo perpetuity | $0 in $10M rollup excluded from budget line per Sloane §5 |
| v7 steady-state monthly rollup | $10,000,000 | eight legs (L6 self-funded parallel) | $1,824,600 / mo 12-mo cum ~$5.99M · 24-mo cum ~$21.05M |
v7 vs v6.6 · the honest delta
v6.6 baseline monthly: ~$1,617,000/mo (Law $1,155K + AUM Ops $200K + SBA $25K + HVAC $152K + Apartment-in-budget $25K + Alt $60K).
v7 monthly: ~$1,824,600/mo (Law $1,155K + AUM Ops $193.6K + SBA $50K + HVAC $350K + Apartment $0 + Car+Social $65K + Proceeds $11K + TBG $0).
Delta: +$207,600/mo (+12.8%) on a raise that is 2.86× larger. Why not 3×? (a) $1.85M of the marginal capital goes to the Carry-Feeder which is net-zero to P&L by design (it services the bigger raise). (b) Law is case-velocity-bound — extra seed buys runway not run-rate. (c) Apartment removed from in-budget line (still runs self-funded). Where monthly DOES lift: HVAC +$198K (2.3× throughput), SBA +$25K (2 acquisitions), Car+Social +$5K (Joe anchor), Proceeds ballast +$11K new. Assumption: linear-triangle ramp modeling, real cash arrives lumpy.
Footnote — on the Ops-Feeder line. The Ops-Feeder’s $193.6K/mo is counted as its own line here (matching v6.6’s convention), but that same cash also trickles into the operating legs while they ramp — so treating it as a separate line is a conservative double-count in the operating-leg direction. We flag it rather than hide it (Norma P2 assumption #6).
Footnote — on the v6.6 Alt baseline of $60K. The v6.6 deck’s Slide 03 flow chart showed the old Alt basket at $25K/mo — conservative pro-forma (its own words). The $60K/mo used in the baseline arithmetic above is Norma’s P2-authoritative model figure — the 15%-underwriting-hurdle interpretation of the same seed — not the deck’s SVG cell. If a reader wants to compare v7 to the more-conservative v6.6 SVG number instead, corrected v6.6 baseline ≈ $1,582K/mo, v7 delta ≈ +$242.6K/mo (+15.3%). We show the model number rather than the deck cell because the model number is what the portfolio was actually being sized against.
Sensitivity footnote · three honest stress tests
If Law under-delivers by 20% ($1,155K → $924K/mo), the monthly roll-up slips to about $1,593.6K — essentially flat against v6.6 baseline — because AUM Ops, HVAC, Car+Social, and SBA all fire independently. Law is large but not the sole load-bearer.
If HVAC ramps in 24 months instead of 12 (to $250K/mo), 12-month cumulative drops ~$1.36M; steady-state still lands above v6.6 baseline. Cash-flow timing risk, not run-rate risk — and it is why HVAC was funded $340K below its ceiling.
If Proceeds loses at 2× the assumed rate (24% instead of 12%), its monthly falls to about $3K — only 0.4% of the total roll-up. The ballast leg stays positive even in its own worst case, and the fund does not depend on it.
12 — Confidential · Projection-Based · Internal Strategy
This document is confidential internal strategy. It is a planning memo for the Consortium’s operating partners, not an offer to sell or a solicitation to buy any security, and not investment, legal, tax, or accounting advice. Do not circulate it outside the partnership.
Every figure here is a projection, not a commitment. The monthly revenue cells, ramp timelines, and cumulative cash figures are modeling estimates built on stated assumptions — each labeled Assumption: where it appears — and on operating metrics supplied by Joe or read from the underlying business models. They describe what the plan is designed to produce if the assumptions hold; they are not guaranteed results, and real cash will arrive lumpier than any straight-line model shows. Several inputs are explicitly still open — the actual carry coupon on the $10M raise, the HVAC partners’ contract status, the SBA term sheet, the Proceeds fee timing and launch states, and TBG’s profit rate — and any of them can move the numbers when they are locked. The open items are listed in full in the accompanying allocation memo.
Nothing in this deck is committed compensation, a promised distribution, or a fixed allocation to any partner. Capital sizing, leg inclusion, and revenue targets are subject to change at Joe’s direction as diligence completes and counterparties paper. Where a figure is single-tenant to one business’s operating metrics (the Apartment leg’s per-building economics; the HVAC install rates), it is shown as-supplied and is not third-party diligenced at this iteration.
Sources and method.
· Capital allocation and roll-up figures are locked by Norma Whitfield’s P2 allocation memo (phases/P2_norma_allocation_table.md / phases/P2_norma_allocation_numbers.json, 2026-09-22).
· The Proceeds (Legal Case Lending) economics are owned by Theo Ashby’s P1a analysis (phases/P1a_theo_proceeds_economics.md, 2026-09-22) — including the 1.55× contract multiple read from the live pricing engine (cc-prod-02:~/nocturne-projects/proceeds/src/pricing.js), the 12% loss rate sourced to Avraham & Sebok, An Empirical Investigation of Third Party Consumer Litigant Funding, Cornell Law Review, and the New York 25%-of-gross funding cap under the Consumer Litigation Funding Act (effective 2026-06-17).
· Portfolio strategy and narrative: Sloane Merrick, P1b + P3 (phases/P1b_sloane_leg_portfolio_framework.md / phases/P3_sloane_narrative.md, 2026-09-22).
· Design and assembly: Simon Ashford, mirroring the v6.6 kick-off deck (inputs/current_v66_index.html, 2026-07-09) — obsidian / gold / silver / crimson palette preserved, cache-bust discipline preserved.
· Every number in this deck traces to one of those sources or is shown with its arithmetic; nothing is filler.